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Colombia is both deeply intertwined with and poorly understood by the outside world.  It 
wants and needs assistance in its struggle against the left-wing FARC and ELN guerrilla 
groups and the various illegal right-wing paramilitary organizations.  Progress on this 
front will help the US, Europe and Colombia’s neighbours.  And yet, public and private 
actors abroad are often confused about the nature of the Colombian conflict. 
 
First, analysts often designate the guerrillas as “narco-terrorists”, seeking to delegitimize 
them and to mobilize powerful anti-drug and antiterrorism sentiment in the US.  But the 
term also portrays the guerrillas as more interested in protecting their drug business than 
in seizing political power through force.  This characterization is fundamentally 
misleading. 
 
The guerrillas are indeed big players in the drug business.  And their frequent bombings 
such as the FARC attack on the El Nogal social club in 2002, killing 32 and injuring 162, 
are terrorism plain and simple.  Guerrilla bombings cause the vast majority of civilian 
injuries in the Colombian conflict.  The use of ‘gas canister bombs’ into which guerrillas 
often pack shrapnel and even rotten bananas to infect the wounds of their victims well 
illustrates FARC viciousness.  In one incident they even hit a church where people were 
sheltering from guerrilla-paramilitary clashes, killing 119 and wounding 90.  The ELN’s 
record is only somewhat less vile than the FARC’s.  
 
Yet guerrilla activity extends beyond narcotics and terrorism.  Roughly a quarter of all 
guerrilla actions are infrastructure attacks, such as bombings of oil pipelines and 
electricity grids, and attacks on means of transport, often stranding people on isolated 
roads to watch their buses and trucks burn.  Checkpoints and road blockages constitute 
another fifth of guerrilla actions.  These activities generate little revenue.  They also 
provoke reactions from the State and the illegal paramilitaries that complicate guerrilla 
efforts to profit from drugs.  They are really only consistent with a goal of overthrowing 
the Colombian government. 
 
Second, a common assumption is that guerrilla income derives overwhelmingly from 
drugs so that successful coca eradication will necessarily cripple their operations.  But the 
guerrillas have diverse revenue sources including kidnapping, extortion, cattle rustling 
and land theft.  We need to apply new creativity to squeeze them fully on all financial 
fronts.  Developing a comprehensive and open land ownership database would be a great 
start.  This would directly strengthen the battle against land theft and, by exposing who 
owns the land where illegal crops are grown, create a more precise alternative to aerial 
eradication. 
 
Third, many policymakers have treated the illegal paramilitaries as an unfortunate 
sideshow rather than a central element in their strategic thinking.  In recent years the 
paramilitaries have been big narco-traffickers while killing roughly five times as many 
civilians as have the guerrillas.  Their vigilantism is largely a response to the 
government’s failure to provide local security and so the guerrilla problem is, in this 
sense, the more fundamental of the two.  Nevertheless, there is now a big paramilitary 
machine in place and Colombia and its partners must face up to it squarely.   
 
A broad cross-party grouping from the Colombian legislature has just drafted a bill 
providing a legal framework for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR) of the paramilitaries.  It caps prison sentences at ten years, requires restitution of 
stolen property and mandates cooperation in truth and reconciliation proceedings.   
 
The bill also calls on the State to build institutional presence where the paramilitaries 
demobilize to prevent illegal armed groups from stepping into the void.  This expensive 
proposition is absolutely vital.  An institutional vacuum would be an open invitation to 
narco-traffickers, guerrillas and even new paramilitaries to thrive and expand.   
 
The Colombian security forces are already overstretched across Colombia’s mountainous 
and jungle-filled terrain.  They simply cannot be everywhere all the time.  More than 
70% of paramilitaries’ massacre victims live in one of Colombia’s many municipalities 
with population densities of less than three people per square kilometre.  Thus, the cost of 
extending proper security to all of Colombia’s remote and vulnerable areas would be 
huge.  The urban electorate would resist such expenditures.  We therefore recommend the 
development of local security institutions through the use of local taxes, local personnel 
and national supervision to prevent abuses.  In our view this completes the best possible 
package for paramilitary DDR. 
 
International support has been decidedly tepid toward Colombia’s negotiations with the 
paramilitaries.  International organizations, governments and NGOs that seem to 
unhesitatingly support virtually any guerrilla DDR process do not want to touch the 
paramilitaries with a ten-foot pole.  Ironically, this detachment is squandering an 
opportunity to reduce violence, improve justice, and contain gun and drug trafficking in 
one of the world’s most violent countries.  Colombia’s neighbours, Europe and North 
America all have a great stake in the outcome.  They must rise to the occasion. 
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